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CARRIERS-SLEEPING CAR COMPANIES-PASSENGERS' ARTICLES
-LOSS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-PULLMAN V. VANDERHOVEN,
io7 S. W. 147 (TEx.)-Held, that where a sleeping car company's
porter was charged with misappropriating a passenger's diamond
ring, which it was claimed he found in the berth, it was no defense
to the sleeping car company's liability therefor that the passenger
was negligent in losing it.
A sleeping car company is neither a common carrier nor an
innkeeper and consequently is not an insurer of the goods and
effects of its passengers, but is a bailee for hire and as such must
exercise reasonable care to protect the passenger's goods. Blum v.
Southern Palace Car Co., Fed. Cases 1574; Lewis v. N. Y. Sleep-
ing Car Co., 143 Mass 267, 273. By the contract which exists
between the passenger and the company, it becomes the duty of the
company to exercise reasonable care and to keep a watch on the
car and its occupants while the relation lasts. Pullman Car Co. v.
Martin, 95 Ga. 314. Where it becomes the duty of a principal by
the terms of a contract to do certain things and he employs an agent
to do those things, the principal is absolutely liable for any breach
by the agent. Wood, Master and Servant, 321 ; Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Garvin, 93 Tenn. 53. And so if the porter, who is employed
to perform the duties imposed on the sleeping car company, fails
to perform them and steals the property of a passenger, the company
is liable. Root v. N. Y. C. and S. Car Co., 28 Mo. App. i99; Pull-
man Palace Car Co. v. Matthews, 74 Tex. 654. As the court in the
principal case says, there is "no principle of law which would exon-
erate one from taking and appropriating another's property because
the owner was negligent in losing it."
CARRIERS-STREET CARS-INJURY TO PASSENGER-DANGEROUS
PLACE-FELDHEIm v. BROOKLYN, Q. C. & S. R. Co., io7 N. Y.
SUPPL. 413.-Held, that where plaintiff was injured while riding on
the rear bumper of a crowded car, he assumed the risk incident to
that position, although his fare was accepted.
In Bard v. Penn. Traction Co., 176 Pa. St. 97, plaintiff was
riding on the bumper, but the ground of absolving defendant from
liability seemed to rest on the fact that conductor did not know
he was there. Where it was the custom of passengers to ride on the
footboards of a stage sleigh when the seats were full, the defendant
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was held accountable. Spooner v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 54 N.
Y. 230. To the same effect is Clark v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 36
N. Y. 135. But it has been held that the riding upon the platform
of a passenger car upon a railroad is such negligence on the part
of the passenger as will bar his recovery for injuries sustained by
being thrown from the platform in rounding a curve. Goodzein v.
Boston & Maine R. R., 84 Me. 203. Here too it was an excursion
train where tickets had been sold in advance, and all the seats had
been taken. Worthington v. Central Vt. R. R. Co., 64 Vt. iO7, is in
harmony with this last holding, but by way of dictum it was indi-
cated that it would have been different if the passenger was forced
to be on the platform by some circumstance. Whether acceptance
of fare is such acquiescence as to overbalance all these objections,
Solomon v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 1o3 N. Y. 437, would seem to
be in point, when it says: "Where a passenger attempted to alight
from a moving train it is not enough to rebut presumption of his
negligence by proof that trainmen acquiesced in his action." But
it has been held that the mere stopping of a crowded car to take
on a passanger is evidence of gross negligence when seats are not
attainable. The Topeka City R'way Co. v. Higgs, 38 Kan. 375.
CONTRACTS-ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION FOR COMPLETING
EXECUTORY CONTRAT-LINZ V. SCHiUCK, 67 ATL. (MD.) 286.-
Held, that the occurrence of substantial and unforeseen difficulties
in the construction of a cellar casting upon the contractor an addi-
tional burden not contemplated by the contract makes his promise
to complete the work a sufficient consideration for the promise of the
owner to pay him additional consideration, even though the contract
was absolute on its face.
This case is undoubtedly an exception to the general rule that
if the rghts of a contractor are fixed by the contract, as here, any
promise to pay him extra for doing what the contract binds him
to do is without consideration, Nelson v. Pickwick Ass. Co., 30
Ill. App. 333; Ritenon v. Mathews, 42 Ind. 7. And it is imma-
terial that the additional sum is necessary for the contractor to
complete the building without loss. Willingham Sash & Door Co.
v. Drew, 117 Ga. 85o. The opposite rule, however, prevails, where
there was ambiguity in the original contract. Wear Bros. v.
Schmelzer, 92 Mo. App. 314. Various courts, recognizing the
equities of particular cases, rather than the weight of authority, have
assigned several grounds for the doctrine that there is considera-
tion for additional compensation. Thus, there is consideration in
gaining specific performance from the contractor, rather than rely-
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ing on an action for damages. Coyner v. Lynde, IO Ind. 282;
Holmes v. Doane, 9 Cush. 135. A new verbal agreement, which
at inception would have no binding force, when acted upon is bind-
ing. Thurston v. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. i. Also a mutual agreement
to rescind while an existing contract is still executory is binding.
Thomason v. Dill, 30 Ala. 454; Thomws v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581.
In like manner, a waiver may make the new contract binding, where
one party, as in above case, may waive the performance of a con-
tract by the other and assume some new and additional obligation
as consideration of performance by the other. Johnson v. Sellers,
33 Ala. 265. See Comment, supra.
CONTRACTS-VALIDITY-OUSTING COURTS OF JURISDICTION-
GITLER V. RUSSIAN CO., io8 N. Y. SUPP. 793. The plaintiffs agreed
upon a valuable consideration, to bring no action on a judgment in
their favor against the defendants in any courts other than those of
Russia. Held, that this contract was not void as ousting courts of
jurisdiction.
Contracts ousting courts of jiirisdiction over future controversies
are universally held invalid as interferences with the course of
justice. Chamberlain v. Railroad, 54 Conn. 472. The reason for
this holding seems obsolete. One court, though feeling bound to
the rule by the doctrine of stare decisis, indicated that were the ques-
tion res nova its decision would have been different. Delaware,
etc., Canal Co. v. Penna. Coal Co., 5o N. Y. 250. And consequently,
the application of this rule has been narrowed in later decisions.
See Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19. The great weight of
authority, however, still declares invalid contracts limiting the juris-
diction over future controversies to particular courts. Doyle v.
In. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Reichard v. Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 518. These
contracts are dearly distinguished from contracts limiting one's
righteto sue, as in the main case, on a cause of action already deter-
mined. The latter may be void on other grounds of public policy.
Kilbourn. v. Field, 78 Pa. St. 194. But as attempts at ouster of
jurisdiction they are never invalid. Montgomery v. Ins. Co., io8
Wis. 146; Railroad v. Harris, 126 Ind. 7. The main case reverses
Gitler v. Russian Co., io6 N. Y. Supp. 886. See 17 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 474-
DEATH-CAUSE-EVIDENCE-LouISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. SIm-
RALL'S ADm'R., 104 *S. W. ioIi (Ky.). Notwithstanding injuries
to his hip and head which the intestate had received in an accident
he continued to perform his regular duties as station agent for six
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months; thereafter contracted typhoid fever or pneumonia; later
became insane, failed steadily, and died four years after receiving
the injuries. Held, his death was the reasonable result of the acci-
dent, the defendant offering proof of no other theory. Barker, J.,
dissenting.
A proximate cause has been defined as the "prominent efficient"
cause. Ellvson v. International, etc., R. Co., 33 Tex. Civ. App. I;
Donaldson v. New York, N. H.., etc., R. Co., 188 Mass. 484. And
no "casual or unexpected causes" should intervene as necessary
factors between the proximate cause and its result. Scheffer v.
Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249. So when the plaintiff was ejected from
a train and as a consequence suffered from exposure it was decided
that his death a month later from typhoid fever was not attributable
to the wrongful ejection. Randall v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 45
La. Ann. 778. And where an injury to a person's knee so reduced
his vitality that he was unable to resist the tuberculosis germs that
attacked his lungs, such injury was not considered the proximate
cause of death from -consumption. Weber v. Third Ave. R. Co.,
42 N. Y. Supp. 789. But in harmony with the case at hand there
are two New York decisions, which rule that there is a strong pre-
sumption that causes of a death, which are not made to appear at
the trial, do not exist. Looram v. Third Ave. R. Co., 6 N. Y. Supp.
504; Sauter v. N. Y. Central, etc., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50.
ExPLosIvEs-INjuRiEs FROm BLASTING-LIABILITY-WYNNE
v. BAILEY, 107 N. Y. SuPP. 545.--Held, that a contractor is not
liable for injury to a stone wall along a street, and to a lawn and
hedge adjacent thereto, due to blasting necessary in grading the
street, unless the blasting was negligently performed.
A different rule obtains in New Jersey. McAndrews v. Collerd,
42 N. J. L., i89. The language of the court there was, "where
one engaged in blasting injures the adjoining property of another,
he is liable without reference to his exercise of care and skill in doing
the work." Even in New York this rule is not uniformly recog-
nized. Tinsman v. B. D. R. R. Co., 2 Dutcher 148, held that "the
proposition that a corporation authorized to construct public high-
ways . . . are vested with the immunity that pertains to the sover-
eign and are exempt from liability to damages for injuries done to
individuals in the exercise of that power, cannot be sustained upon
grounds of reason and justice." Where death is caused by the
voluntary explosion of a blast by a dredging company no amount
of care and skill in exploding the blast, not even the highest, will
excuse the company from responsibility. Munro v. Pac. Coast
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Dredging Co., 84 Cal. 515. As stated by Bigelow, ., in Mellen v.
Western Railroad, 4 Gray (Mass.) 3oi, "great latitude of discretion
is to be allowed to those who are entrusted by law with the erection
and maintenance of great public works." But this is no excuse
for carelessness, negligence, or wanton disregard of the rights of
individuals. Hunter v. Farren, 127 Mass. 48i. Here the negligent
blasting did no more than interfere with plaintiff's business by
frightening away of employes, and they were allowed to recover
for such interruption.
INJUNCTIoN-GROUNDS-PICKETING OF COMPLAINANTS' PREM-
ISES-BARNES V. CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, 83 N. E. 94o
(ILL.).-Held, that the very fact of the defendants establishing a
picket line about the complainants' premises, irrespective of whether
physical violence was resorted to, was itself an act of intimidation
and unwarrantable interference with the complainants' rights, enti-
tling them to protection against the annoyance. Scott and Farmer,
JJ., dissenting.
It is his right to a "probable expectancy" that his labor market
will not be disturbed unlawfully which entitles an employer to an
injunction against the picketing of his premises. Tersey City Print-
ing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. .759. But by the great weight of
authority this right of the employer's is violated by picketing, not
as a matter of law, but only when in fact the picketing amounts to
coercion. Foster v. Retail Clerks', etc., Ass'n, 39 Misc. (N. Y.)
48. Thus picketing, if accompanied by force, threats, or intimida-
tion, will be enjoined. Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595. And
the injunction will be refused if not accompanied by such. Karges
Furniture Co. v. Woodworkers' Union, 165 Ind. 421. The aggres-
siveness, however, with which picketing has come to be conducted has
led some courts to hold, as in the present case, that it is intimidating
per se, and therefore can be enjoined as a matter of law. See Otis
Steel Co. v'. Union, i1o Fed. 698; Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass.
92. This minority holding is not so much a conflict with the main
body of authority as it is a recognition of changed industrial condi-
tions, under which picketing must needs be intimidating. Franklin
Union V. People, 220 111 355.
LOGS AND LOGGING-SALE OF GRowING TIMBER-REmovAL OF
TIMBER-ST. LOUIS CYPREss Co. v. THIBODAUX, 45 SOUTH. 742
(LA.). Under a contract giving the purchaser of trees a right to
cut and remove the same for a definite period of time, held, that if
the mere cutting of trees can be construed in any case as entitling
the purchaser to remove the same after the expiration of the time
limit, such cutting must be- done seasonably, and with a bona fide
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intention to remove the timber so cut within the period designated.
Monroe, J., dissenting.
Subject to the limitations imposed on all transfers of real prop-
erty, standing timber may be bought and sold by contract. i Wash-
burn on Real Property, 3. And so some courts have held that if the
number of trees sold is specific, the buyer gets title to all those trees,
even though the contract of sale limits the time for removal of the
timber, and only part has been removed within the time limit. Hoit
V. Stratton Mills, 54 N. H. 1O9. But by the weight of authority,
when there is a sale of timber with a definite time given for removal,
the transaction is a conditional sale; and the buyer will own only that
timber which he has removed before the time expires. Kellam v.
McKinstry, 69 N. Y. 264; Weber v. Proctor, 89 Me. 404. The word
"removed" as used in this connection has received a very liberal
interpretation. Thus if timber has been hauled to other parts of the
same premises, or has been cut up into railroad ties, it has been
sufficiently "removed" to become the absolute property of the buyer.
Watson v. Gross, 112 Mo. App. 615; Johnson v. Truitt, 122 Ga.
327. In fact the great majority of courts hold that it is enough if
the timber is simply cut within the time limit. Macomber v. Rail-
road, io8 Mich. 491; Hicks v. Smith, 77 Wis. 146. Contra: Kem-
ble v. Dresser, 42 Mass. 271.
NEGLIGENcE-DANGEROus-APPLIANCES - STEAM BOILERS.-
STATLER V. RAY MFG. Co., io9 N. Y. SupP. 172. Where the defend-
ant manufactured and sold a steam boiler for use in a public building
and the boiler thereafter exploded by reason of the defendant's
negligent construction, and the plaintiff was injured, held, that the
plaintiff, though sustaining no contractual relation with the defend-
ant manufacturer, was entitled to recover against it, though there
was no claim of fraud or deceit in the sale of the boiler. McLennan,
P. J., and Kruse, J., dissenting.
In general the manufacturer of goods is liable for their negligent
construction to no one other than those to whom he sells the goods.
Curtin v. Somerset, 14o Pa. St. 7o . The rule is based on a want
of privity of contract. Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N. J. L. i.
But there are two exceptions to this rule. One is that when a
maker of an article knows it to be defective and likely to cause
injury, yet sells it fraudulently, he is liable in tort to any third party
injured thereby. Lewis v. Terry, iii Cal. 39. And, secondly, if
the goods themselves are imminently dangerous, it is clear that their
maker owes a public duty to use reasonable care in their production
and sale. See McCafferty v. Mossberg & G. Mfg. Co., 23 R. I.
381. In the application of this rule there is some conflict. The
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following goods are held within the rule: Poisonous drugs (Norton
v. Sewall, Io6 Mass. 143) ; naphtha (Standard Oil Co. v. Wakefield,
lO2 Va. 824) ; but not petroleum (Standard Oil Co. v. Murphy, 119
Fed. 572). There is a direct conflict as to whether steam appliances
for generating power are within this rule, the main case being
opposed by Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 494; and by one other, Heizer
v. K. & D. Mfg. Co., iio Mo. 605.
NEGLIGENCE-REs IPSA LOQUITUR-INJURY TO PERSON NEAR
RAILROAD TRACK.-EATON v. N. Y. CENT. & H. R. R. Co., 1o9 N.
Y. SuPP. 419. Plaintiff while at a railroad depot on business was
injured. He testified that he stood on the platform six or eight feet
from a passing freight train and that something extending from a
car struck him. The railroad company claimed that plaintiff was
struck by a part of the engine, while attempting to cross the tracks
and did not offer any explanation of any swinging object extending
from train. Held, if plaintiff was injured as he stood on the plat-
form by something projecting from the train, jury might apply the
rule of res ipsa loquitur. McLennan, P. J., and Kruse, J., dissent-
ing.
The general rule is that before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
can be applied and the burden of proof thrown on the carrier, it
must first be shown that the injury complained of resulted from
the breaking of machinery, collision, derailment of cars, or something
improper in the conduct of the carrier's business. Thomas v. Phila-
delphia, etc., R. R. Co., 148 Pa. St. i8o; Hawkins v. Front St.
Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592. Thus, where the accident causing the
injury is connected with apparatus wholly under the control of the
carrier (Miller v. Ocean S. S. Co., 118 N. Y. 199), as the falling of
a gangway (Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 IIl. 598), or the breaking
of a paddle wheel (Yerkes v. Keokuk N. L. Packet Co., 7 Mo. App.
265) ; it is well settled that there is a presumption of negligence on
part of the carrier. On the other hand, it is equally well settled that
the mere breaking of a passenger's leg (Penn. R. Co. v. McKinney,
124 Pa. 462), or a rock falling upon a passenger while the train is
going through a cut (Fleming v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., 158 Pa. St.
130), raises no such presumption, and in such cases negligence must
be proved by the plaintiff. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. State, Saving-
ton, 71 Md. 599. Between these cases, there are thoselike the princi-
pal case,on the border-line. Thus, it has been held,that the mere fact
that cinders fell from defendant's locomotive and injured plaintiff's
eye raised no presumption of negligence. Searles v. Manhattan R.
Co., IOI N. Y. 661. But contra, Lowery v. Manhattan R. R. Co.,
99 N. Y. 158.
